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Abstract—With the all IP based Next Generation Networks being 
deployed around the world, the use of real-time multimedia 
service applications is being extended from normal daily 
communications to emergency situations. However, currently 
different emergency providers utilise differing networks and 
different technologies. As such, conversations could be 
terminated at the setup phase or data could be transmitted in 
plaintext should incompatibility issues exit between terminals. To 
this end, a novel security gateway that can provide the necessary 
security support for incompatible terminals was proposed, 
developed and implemented to ensure the successful 
establishment of secure real-time multimedia conversations. A 
series of experiments were conducted to evaluate the security 
gateway through the use 40 Boghe softphone acting as the 
terminals. The experimental results demonstrate that the best 
performance of the prototype was achieved by utilising a 
multithreading and multi-buffering technique, with an average of 
582 microseconds processing overhead. Based upon the ITU-T’s 
150 milliseconds one way delay recommendation for voice 
communications, it is envisaged that such a marginal overhead 
will not be noticed by users in practice.      
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Real-time multimedia services, such as voice over IP and 
image transmitting, have become indispensable applications for 
the Next Generation Network (NGN), providing an economical 
and important all IP based communication channel for the 
modern society [1]. Real-time multimedia services can be 
utilised not only for daily communications (e.g. calling friends 
and family, video conferencing with business partners) but also 
in emergency situations (e.g. transmitting images of a car 
accident to first responders) [2-4]; therefore, private and 
sensitive information would be inevitably be transmitted in 
various conversations. Furthermore, real-time multimedia 
services can be established from terminals within the NGN and 
also across domains with other communication networks (e.g. 
Private Mobile Radio (PMR) and Public Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN)) [5, 6]; consequently, certain incompatibility 
issues could be developed when users from different networks 
try to communicate with each other. 
Within the NGN environment, the Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP) is the predominant choice for setting real-time 
conversations in the signalling plane and Real-time Transfer 
Protocol (RTP) or Secure RTP (SRTP) are the de facto 
standards for transmitting the conversation in the form of IP 
packets in the media plane [7-9]. Nonetheless, various media 
codecs (e.g. GSM, PCM) and security controls (e.g. 
AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80, AES_CM_192_HMAC_S 
HA1_32) can be utilised by terminals to encode/decode and 
protect real-time media contents respectively. A conversation 
could be terminated prematurely should the calling parties use 
different codecs and/or security controls, even if they were in 
life threatening situations and intended to utilise real-time 
multimedia services to communicate with emergency 
responders; or the conversation could be established but 
without proper security protections, leaving the information 
transmitted in plaintext.     
With the aim of overcoming the issue caused by 
mismatched codecs and/or security controls, gateways should 
be implemented to bridge the communication between 
incompatible terminals either within the NGN or from other 
networks. Since the late 1990’s, a number of media gateways 
that provide transcoding support (i.e. convert one codec to 
another) have already been defined and developed for both 
research and commercial purposes, including [10], [11], [12], 
[13] and [14]. In comparison, little work has been carried out 
on solving the problem posed by incompatible security controls 
(i.e. the confidentiality and integrity of the information will not 
be protected). Therefore, this paper will present a working 
prototype of the Technology Independent Security Gateway 
(TI-SGW) that is designed to fulfil the purpose of cross-
ciphering (i.e. transform one security control to another) for 
incompatible terminals [15]. The paper will focus upon 
presenting an evaluation of the gateway’s performance 
characteristics. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 
presents related work in the domain of security controls for 
real-time multimedia services; section 3 illustrates the security 
gateway architecture and its function. The prototype of the 
gateway, its performance characteristics and the impact of 
these performance characteristics will be discussed in section 4, 
5 and 6 respectively; and the conclusion and future work will 
be presented in section 7. 
II. SECURITY CONTROLS FOR REAL-TIME MULTIMEDIA 
COMMUNICATIONS 
It is well documented that SRTP is the fundamental 
protocol for securing the real-time multimedia communication 
on the NGN; and that SRTP relies upon the combination of 
crypto suites and key exchange methods to ensure the 
confidentiality and integrity of multimedia traffic. In this 
section, existing crypto suites and key exchange methods for 
securing the real-time multimedia communications will be 
examined.  
A. Crypto suites of the SRTP 
A crypto suite is a mixture of encryption and Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms that offer 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication for a piece of 
information. The default encryption algorithm of the SRTP is 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) that can operate in two 
modes (i.e. Segmented Integer Counter Mode AES (i.e. 
AES_CM) and AES in f8 mode) and three key sizes (i.e. 128, 
192 and 256); and the standard message authentication and 
integrity algorithm of the SRTP is HMAC-SHA1 that can 
utilise two key sizes (i.e. 32 and 80) [7]. Based upon the 
combination of the encryption, message authentication and 
integrity algorithms and various key sizes, a set of crypto suites 
can be obtained for the SRTP (as presented in table 1) [16, 17]. 
TABLE I.  A LIST OF CRYPTO SUITES OF THE SRTP 
Crypto Suites 
AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 
AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 
AES_F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 
AES_192_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 
AES_192_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 
AES_256_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 
AES_256_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 
B. Key exchange protocols for the SRTP 
A key exchange protocol is the method by which 
cryptographic keys are exchanged between users, permitting 
cryptographic algorithms to be utilised. A number of key 
exchange protocols have been proposed to incorporate with the 
SRTP, constituting the security key exchange process between 
various terminals. In general, a key exchange protocol can 
utilise one of the three ways to manage the security key: 
through a Key Management Server (KMS), via the signalling 
plane and through the media plane.     
Two key exchange protocols utilise the KMS approach to 
manage their key information: MIKEY pre-shared key and 
MIKEY-public key encryption [18, 19]. In both cases, a KMS 
is required for distributing security key material to terminals. 
Initially, individual terminals authenticate with the KMS to 
obtain their security key material (e.g. a pre-shared key or a 
private key) which is then utilised for securing the media 
transmission once the call set up phase is completed in the 
signalling plane; also the security key transmission process 
between individual terminals and the KMS should be protected 
by additional methods (e.g. a digital signature or a 
bootstrapping server function) [18, 20].  
Three key exchange protocols rely upon the signalling 
plane to perform the key exchange process: Session 
Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media 
Streams (SDES), IMS Authentication and Key Agreement and 
Otway-Rees based key management [16, 20]. In this way, the 
key material is exchanged between terminals during the call 
setup SDP negotiation process in the signalling plane. 
Therefore, these protocols can only be utilised when the 
signalling plane is protected; otherwise, the confidentiality and 
integrity of the key material could be compromised.  
ZRTP is a media plane key management protocol that 
utilises the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method to establish 
security key materials between terminals [21]. Terminals start 
to discover whether their peers also support the ZRTP once 
they obtain their IP addresses during the call set up phase; the 
media communication will be protected by ZRTP if all 
terminals in the conversation are compatible with the protocol.  
It is not the author’s intention to compare the advantages 
and disadvantage of the aforementioned crypto suites and key 
exchange protocols for the SRTP, but merely to present the 
variety of security controls which could be utilised for securing 
real-time multimedia services within the NGN environment. As 
mentioned in the introduction, a real-time multimedia session 
will not be established or protected if terminals utilise different 
security controls. Therefore, a security gateway that can ensure 
the confidentiality, integrity and authentication of a real-time 
multimedia session of security incompatible terminals is 
required. Such a security gateway will be described in the next 
section.    
III. A  TECHNOLOGY INDEPENDENT SECURITY GATEWAY 
With the purpose of providing security support for any 
incompatible terminals to establish real-time multimedia 
communications, a novel technology independent Security 
Gateway was previously proposed by the authors [15].  
 
Figure 1.  The TI-SGW Architecture 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the proposed security gateway 
architecture contains a number of internal modules, which 
enable the gateway to provide secure and timely security 
support. Based upon the nature of each internal module, they 
can be categorised into three levels: the signalling, media and 
management components. The signalling plane components are 
mainly responsible for negotiating with the signalling plane 
regarding various parameters for the establishment and 
management of a conversation. The media components are in 
charge of setting up appropriate media communication 
channels based upon the information negotiated in the 
signalling plane for incompatible terminals. The management 
controller controls the components from both the signalling and 
media planes; it also provides additional functionalities, such as 
resource management, error control and performance 
monitoring.  
When a real-time multimedia session involving 
incompatible terminals occurs, the presence of the TI-SGW 
will be required. A high-level of information flow between the 
signalling plane and the TI-SGW and how the information is 
utilised by the gateway is illustrated in figure 2. When the 
signalling sends a SIP message to the TI-SGW, the Signalling 
Controller checks the type of the message and responds 
accordingly. If it is an invite message, the Signalling Controller 
replies with a 200OK message that contains the security 
capabilities (e.g. AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 and 
security key information) and connection information (e.g. IP 
address and port number) of the gateway; in the meantime, the 
200OK message will be forwarded to the Management 
Controller which utilises the information to create media thread 
for the Media Controller. Based upon the information provided 
by the Management Controller, the Media Controller can build 
up receivers and senders with appropriate security policies for 
decrypting incoming SRTP traffic from one terminal (e.g. 
caller) and encrypting outgoing traffic for the other terminal 
(e.g. callee). If it is a BYE message, the Management 
Controller utilises it to close related threads at the media level 
accordingly. 
 
Figure 2.  A high-level information flow within the TI-SGW 
Based upon the TI-SGW architecture and the information 
flow logic, a prototype of the gateway is developed. Details of 
the prototype are fully described in section 4. 
IV. TI-SGW PROTOTYPE 
A working prototype of the proposed security gateway was 
developed based upon the architecture design presented in 
Section 3. The prototype, designed specially to deal with real-
time multimedia traffic, is capable of providing security 
support for incompatible terminals in a timely fashion. 
According to the design of the TI-SGW architecture, the 
prototype was developed in Linux with three segments: the 
Security Resource Function Controller was developed in Java, 
while the Management Controller and the Security Resource 
Function Processor were developed in C. The connection 
between the Management Controller and the Security Resource 
Function Controller was created via a socket to minimise any 
potential communication delays.   
The Security Resource Function Controller was developed 
based upon an existing open source SIP stack implementations 
(i.e. IMS-communicator) [22]. The Security Resource Function 
Controller is able to register the gateway with the signalling 
domain of the NGN through mutual authentication. Once the 
registration process is completed, the Security Resource 
Function Controller can be utilised to establish various call 
setup processes with the signalling plane of the NGN via 
different types of SIP messages stated in RFC 3261 [8]. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the Security Resource 
Function Controller forwards the information of the call setup 
to the Management Controller which will deal it accordingly 
(e.g. create/terminate media connections). 
The Management Controller and the Security Resource 
Function Processor were developed based upon a number of C 
open source libraries: Pthread, Socket, Semaphore and Libsrtp 
[23]. Their purpose is described in Table 2. In addition, a code 
snippet of how the Security Resource Function Processor 
operates after the Management Controllers create threads for 
media connection is illustrated in Figure 3. 
TABLE II.  OPEN SOURCE LIBRARIES UTILISED BY THE SECURITY 
GATEWAY 
Library Purpose 
Pthread 
Utilised by the Management Controller to create thread 
for media receivers and senders 
Semaphore 
Used by the Security Resource Function Processor to 
ensure the access to the critical section (i.e. a dynamic 
buffer with unlimited size for media traffic) is 
guaranteed, reducing potential packet lost issue. 
Libsrtp 
Capitalised by the Management Controller to provide 
security capabilities to the security gateway with 
majority of crypto suites presented in Table 1 
Socket 
Utilised by Security Resource Function Processor for 
the setup of media receivers and senders at the socket 
level   
 
It is envisaged that the Security Resource Function 
Controller and the Management Controller will not take much 
of the processing powering as the SIP is a lightweight text-
based protocol and management of the security gateway would 
be performed occasionally with light activities (e.g. viewing 
how many existing connections). In comparison, the Security 
Resource Function Processor could require more resource as it 
deals constantly with media connections in real-time. 
Furthermore, a higher amount of processing power would be 
demanded as the number of connections increases. In order to 
explore the association between the number of threads and 
buffers with the processing power and their impact upon the 
real-time multimedia conversations, two versions of the 
sending mechanism of the Security Resource Function 
Processor were developed: a) Multi-thread Multi-buffer (MM) 
and b) Single thread Single buffer (SS). MM provides a 
dedicated thread and buffer for each sending thread while SS 
indicates that only one thread and one buffer is created for the 
sending function regardless the number of terminals. The 
receiving function utilises the multi-thread approach (i.e. each 
receiving port is a unique thread). 
 
Figure 3.  Logics for receiving and sending threads 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
With the aim of evaluating the TI-SGW, a set of 
experiments was conducted within a local private network. The 
security gateway prototype was configured on an Intel Pentium 
4 computer (specification: Duo core 2.80GHZ processor and 
2.9GB memory) with Ubuntu 12.04. Boghe was chosen as the 
terminal as it supports two crypto suites (i.e. 
AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 and 
AES_CM_128_HMAC_sha1_32) [24]. The Open IMS core 
was utilised to simulate the signalling part of the NGN [25]; the 
Open IMS core handles user registration and call set up 
processes. With the aim of obtaining meaningful experiment 
outcomes, 40 Boghe terminals (i.e. 20 pairs) were utilised: 
callers and callees were configured to use different crypto 
suites but the same codec (i.e. Pulse Code Modulation (PCM)); 
the capability of the TI-SGW could not be thoroughly tested if 
a lower number of terminals was chosen, e.g. 20 terminals; 
nonetheless, experiment outputs could be inaccurate should a 
higher number of terminals was picked, e.g. 60 terminals.   
Lastly, SDES was chosen as the key exchange protocol 
between the Security gateway and terminals due to its 
simplicity. 
In total, 6 sets of experiments were conducted by utilising 
the combination of several parameters within the sending 
function of the security gateway: the thread and buffer (i.e. 
MM or SS), the waiting period before checking the buffer (i.e. 
1 millisecond, 10 millisecond), and a random time between 1 
and 10 millisecond. Also, several operational characteristics 
were chosen to evaluate the TI-SGW: CPU usage, the overall 
processing (i.e. the duration between a SRTP packet enters and 
leaves the TI-SGW), and the decryption and encryption time of 
a SRTP packet. 
Figure 4 illustrates the CPU usage of the TI-SGW under the 
6 experiments. In general, a higher amount of processing 
power is required as the number of terminal pairs increases. 
The MM based approach requires more processing power than 
the SS based method does for each additional pair. The waiting 
period for checking the buffer has little effect on the SS based 
methods in terms of the Security gateway CPU usage. In 
comparison, the same parameter has a stronger influence on the 
Security gateway CPU usage when the MM based approach 
was utilised. For example, when 20 pairs of terminal were 
connected to the Security gateway, its CPU usage were 60% 
and 32% for the waiting period of 1 millisecond and 10 
milliseconds respectively. 
 
Figure 4.  TI-SGW CPU usage 
Figure 5 presents the outcome of the cumulative 
distribution function on the overall processing time of the 
Security gateway for SRTP packets of the first pair of terminals 
in various scenarios. In total, about 200,000 SRTP packets 
were processed for the first pair of terminals, representing a 25-
minute conversation (i.e. from the starting to the ending time of 
each experiment). As shown in the figure, both MM and SS 
approaches have less influence on the overall SRTP processing 
time than the waiting periods do. When the waiting period was 
chosen for 1 millisecond, 80% of the SRTP packets were 
processed within 1 millisecond frame. In comparison, the 
Security gateway had to take 8-10 milliseconds to process 80% 
of the SRTP packets when the 10 milliseconds waiting period 
were chosen. 
 
Figure 5.  The overall processing time for SRTP packets of the first pair of 
terminals 
Figure 6 and 7 show the decryption and encryption 
processing time for the SRTP packets of the first pair of 
terminals from all 6 experiments. In general, the security 
gateway spends between 10-30 microseconds to decrypt 90% 
of the SRTP packets in all scenarios; while the encryption 
process only takes around 10-20 microseconds for the same 
amount of SRTP packets [26, 27]. 
 
Figure 6.  Decryption processing time for SRTP packets of the first pair of 
terminals 
 
Figure 7.  Encryption processing time for SRTP packets of the first pair of 
terminal 
TABLE III.  THE AVERAGE PROCESSING TIME FOR OVERALL, DECRYPTION 
AND ENCRYPTION PER SRTP PACKET IN MICROSECOND 
 MM1-10 MM1 M10 SS1-10 SS1 SS10 
Overall 3,566 581.5 5,067 3,758 949 6,349 
Decryption 20.4 22.2 19.9 15.2 16.3 15.1 
Encryption 12.7 13.1 12 10.7 11 10.6 
 
The average processing time on a SRTP packet during the 
overall, decryption and encryption processes in all experiments 
is summarised in Table 3. In general, the MM approach with 1 
millisecond waiting period achieved the best overall processing 
time of 581.5 microseconds. In comparison, it takes the SS 
approach with a 10 milliseconds waiting period around 6 
milliseconds; interestingly the same approach achieved the best 
performance on average decryption and encryption time with 
15.1 and 10.6 microseconds respectively.   
VI. DISCUSSION 
Based upon the presented experiment outcomes, it 
demonstrates that the security gateway prototype is capable of 
providing support for incompatible terminals for the NGN 
platform. Generally, the multi-threading multi buffer based 
approach provides better performance than the single threading 
buffer based technique does in terms of overall delay 
introduced by the security gateway (as demonstrated in Table 
3). This is expected as the MM approach provides dedicated 
threads for each pair of terminals while all the terminals have 
to share the single processing resource in the SS technique. 
Nonetheless, the shortcoming of the former approach is that it 
requires more CPU resources for supporting the same number 
of terminal pairs than its counterpart does as the additional 
threads were created (as demonstrated in Figure 4). 
The waiting periods were chosen based upon previous 
empirical studies. The CPU of the security gateway would be 
taken over by the checking process should a shorter period of 
time was chosen (e.g. 20 microseconds); while a degraded 
quality would be experienced by users if a longer period of 
time was allocated (e.g. 100 milliseconds). This phenomenon is 
also reflected by results presented in Figure 4. Nonetheless, 
based upon the ITU-T’s one way delay less than 150 
millisecond recommendation on voice communications [28], it 
demonstrates that the overall delay that is introduced by the TI-
SGW could be ignored as the overall processing time is less 
than 10 milliseconds for most of the scenarios (apart the result 
from SS1-10). 
From the results presented by Figure 6, 7 and Table 3, they 
demonstrate that the decryption and encryption time on SRTP 
packets are significantly smaller than the overall processing 
time. Hence, more investigation should be carried on the topic 
of reducing the overall delay time but without compromising 
the processing powers. Furthermore, the decryption and 
encryption time on the SRTP packet should be the same in 
theory as the symmetric encryption method was utilised. 
However, the results show that the security gateway took more 
time on the decryption process than the encryption process. 
This could be caused by the implementation of the libsrtp 
library (e.g. the number of machine cycles for both processes 
could be different).    
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has identified the need for a security gateway 
that can provide ciphering support for incompatible real-time 
multimedia terminals for the NGN. Also based upon the 
security gateway architecture, a working prototype that is fit 
the purpose has been developed.  
Based upon the experiment outputs, the results demonstrate 
that a gateway can provide security support for incompatible 
terminals. It is envisaged that the overhead introduced by the 
TI-SGW (less than 10 milliseconds) would have little impact 
on the real-time multi-media conversations based upon the 
ITU-T’s 150 milliseconds one way delay recommendation on 
one way voice communication. To this end, future research 
will be focused upon two directions: reducing the overhead 
caused by the TI-SGW and obtaining real user’s opinion upon 
the TI-SGW and getting a measure for the Quality of 
Experience. 
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